The Central Idea

A system is reliable when it continues to function as required.

If

\[ R=P(\text{system works}), \]

then the failure probability is

\[ \boxed{Q=1-R}. \]

Reliability and failure probability are complements.

Reliability

Reliability is the probability that an item, component, or system performs successfully under defined conditions for a specified period.

Reliability is therefore always tied to:

Failure Probability

If reliability is

\[ R, \]

then failure probability is

\[ \boxed{Q=1-R}. \]

Likewise,

\[ \boxed{R=1-Q}. \]

Example: Component Reliability

Suppose a component has reliability

\[ R=0.97. \]

Then its failure probability is

\[ Q=1-0.97. \] \[ \boxed{Q=0.03}. \]

Reliability as a Function of Time

Reliability often changes with time.

We write

\[ \boxed{R(t)=P(T>t)}, \]

where \(T\) is the time to failure.

This is also called the survival function.

Failure Distribution

The cumulative failure probability by time \(t\) is

\[ F(t)=P(T\le t). \]

Since success beyond time \(t\) and failure by time \(t\) are complementary,

\[ \boxed{R(t)=1-F(t)}. \]

Example: Failure by a Deadline

Suppose

\[ F(100)=0.08. \]

Then the probability of surviving beyond time \(100\) is

\[ R(100)=1-0.08 \] \[ \boxed{0.92}. \]

Series Systems

In a series system, every required component must work for the system to work.

If independent components have reliabilities

\[ R_1,R_2,\ldots,R_n, \]

then

\[ \boxed{ R_{\text{series}} = \prod_{i=1}^{n}R_i }. \]

Why Series Reliability Multiplies

The system succeeds only if

\[ C_1\cap C_2\cap\cdots\cap C_n \]

occurs.

Under independence,

\[ P(C_1\cap\cdots\cap C_n) = P(C_1)\cdots P(C_n). \]

Example: Two Components in Series

Suppose

\[ R_1=0.95 \]

and

\[ R_2=0.90. \]

Then

\[ R_{\text{series}} =0.95(0.90) \] \[ \boxed{0.855}. \]

Series Systems Become Less Reliable as Required Components Accumulate

If every component has reliability below \(1\), multiplying several reliabilities generally produces a smaller system reliability.

A long chain of individually reliable components can therefore produce a noticeably less reliable overall system.

Parallel Systems

In a simple parallel system, the system works as long as at least one component works.

The system fails only if every parallel component fails.

Parallel Reliability

If independent components have failure probabilities

\[ Q_i=1-R_i, \]

then

\[ P(\text{all fail}) = \prod_{i=1}^{n}Q_i. \]

Therefore,

\[ \boxed{ R_{\text{parallel}} = 1-\prod_{i=1}^{n}(1-R_i) }. \]

Example: Two Components in Parallel

Suppose both components have reliability

\[ 0.90. \]

Each has failure probability

\[ 0.10. \]

Both fail with probability

\[ 0.10(0.10)=0.01. \]

Therefore,

\[ R_{\text{parallel}} =1-0.01 \] \[ \boxed{0.99}. \]

Redundancy

Redundancy means providing additional components or paths so that one failure does not necessarily cause total system failure.

Parallel structure is one common form of redundancy.

Redundancy Can Increase Reliability

Compare a single component with reliability \(0.9\) to two independent parallel components, each with reliability \(0.9\).

Single component:

\[ R=0.9. \]

Parallel pair:

\[ R=1-(0.1)^2 \] \[ =\boxed{0.99}. \]

Redundancy Has Costs

Redundant components may increase:

Reliability improvement must therefore be compared with implementation cost.

Mixed Series-Parallel Systems

Real systems often contain both series and parallel structures.

A useful strategy is to simplify the system one block at a time.

  1. Combine simple parallel groups.
  2. Combine simple series groups.
  3. Repeat until one equivalent reliability remains.

Example: Parallel Pair Followed by a Series Component

Suppose components A and B are in parallel, each with reliability \(0.9\). Their block reliability is

\[ R_{AB}=1-(0.1)(0.1)=0.99. \]

Suppose this block is in series with component C of reliability \(0.95\).

Then

\[ R_{\text{system}} =0.99(0.95) \] \[ \boxed{0.9405}. \]

Independence Is a Modeling Assumption

The simple multiplication formulas for series and parallel systems depend on independence.

Components may fail together because of:

Common-Cause Failure

A common-cause failure is one event that can disable multiple components at the same time.

Common-cause failures can sharply reduce the benefit expected from redundancy.

Apparent independence should therefore be checked carefully.

Conditional Reliability

Reliability can be updated when new information becomes available.

For example,

\[ P(T>t+s\mid T>t) \]

is the probability that an item survives an additional interval \(s\), given that it has already survived to time \(t\).

Memoryless Reliability

The exponential distribution has the memoryless property:

\[ P(T>t+s\mid T>t)=P(T>s). \]

Under this model, surviving to the present does not change the modeled probability of surviving an additional interval of the same length.

Constant Failure Rate Model

Under a constant failure rate \(\lambda>0\),

\[ \boxed{ R(t)=e^{-\lambda t} }. \]

The cumulative failure probability is

\[ \boxed{ F(t)=1-e^{-\lambda t} }. \]

Example: Constant Failure Rate

Suppose

\[ \lambda=0.02 \]

per year.

After \(5\) years,

\[ R(5)=e^{-0.02(5)} \] \[ =e^{-0.1} \] \[ \boxed{\approx0.9048}. \]

Failure Probability under the Exponential Model

Using the previous example,

\[ F(5)=1-e^{-0.1}. \] \[ \boxed{F(5)\approx0.0952}. \]

Mean Time to Failure

For an exponential lifetime model,

\[ \boxed{ E[T]=\frac{1}{\lambda} }. \]

This is often called the mean time to failure, or MTTF, for a nonrepairable item.

Example: MTTF

If

\[ \lambda=0.02, \]

then

\[ E[T]=\frac{1}{0.02} \] \[ \boxed{50}. \]

The units match the time units used for \(\lambda\).

Hazard Rate

The hazard rate describes the instantaneous failure tendency among items that have survived to time \(t\).

Formally,

\[ \boxed{ h(t)=\frac{f(t)}{R(t)} }. \]

Under an exponential model,

\[ h(t)=\lambda. \]

Failure Rates Need Not Be Constant

Real systems may have:

A constant hazard model is useful, but it should not be assumed automatically.

Reliability over Repeated Independent Demands

Suppose a component succeeds independently on each use with probability

\[ r. \]

The probability it succeeds on all \(n\) uses is

\[ \boxed{r^n}. \]

Example: Repeated Uses

If success probability per use is

\[ 0.99 \]

and the component must succeed on \(10\) independent uses, then

\[ P(\text{all succeed})=(0.99)^{10}. \] \[ \boxed{\approx0.9044}. \]

Probability of At Least One Failure

If all \(n\) uses must succeed,

\[ P(\text{at least one failure}) = 1-r^n. \]

In the previous example,

\[ 1-(0.99)^{10} \] \[ \boxed{\approx0.0956}. \]

k-out-of-n Systems

A \(k\)-out-of-\(n\) system works if at least \(k\) of its \(n\) components work.

Series and parallel systems are special cases:

Identical Independent Components in a k-out-of-n System

If each component works independently with probability \(r\), then

\[ \boxed{ R = \sum_{j=k}^{n} \binom{n}{j} r^j(1-r)^{n-j} }. \]

This is a binomial probability.

Example: Two-out-of-Three System

Suppose three independent components each have reliability

\[ r=0.9. \]

The system works if at least two work:

\[ R = \binom{3}{2}(0.9)^2(0.1) + \binom{3}{3}(0.9)^3. \] \[ =3(0.81)(0.1)+0.729. \] \[ =0.243+0.729. \] \[ \boxed{R=0.972}. \]

Availability

Reliability and availability are related but different.

Reliability asks whether the system avoids failure over an interval.

Availability asks whether the system is operational at a particular time, allowing for repair and restoration.

Repairable Systems

For repairable systems, failure is not necessarily permanent.

Useful quantities may include:

Reliability versus Safety

A reliable system is not automatically a safe system.

Reliability concerns whether required functions continue to operate.

Safety concerns whether unacceptable harm is avoided.

A system can be highly reliable at performing a function that is itself unsafe.

Reliability versus Quality

Quality and reliability also differ.

Quality may describe whether a product meets specifications when delivered.

Reliability asks whether performance persists over time and use.

Expected Failure Cost

Reliability can be connected to decision analysis by assigning a loss to failure.

If failure probability is \(Q\) and failure cost is \(C\), a simple expected failure cost is

\[ \boxed{E[L]=QC}. \]

Example: Expected Failure Cost

Suppose

\[ Q=0.02 \]

and a failure costs

\[ \$500{,}000. \]

Then

\[ E[L]=0.02(500{,}000) \] \[ \boxed{\$10{,}000}. \]

Reliability Improvement as a Decision

Suppose an upgrade increases reliability from \(0.96\) to \(0.99\).

Failure probability falls from

\[ 0.04 \]

to

\[ 0.01. \]

Whether the upgrade is worthwhile depends on the reduction in expected loss relative to the upgrade cost.

Failure Probability Reduction

The absolute reduction in failure probability is

\[ 0.04-0.01 \] \[ =\boxed{0.03}. \]

The relative reduction is

\[ \frac{0.04-0.01}{0.04} \] \[ =0.75. \]

This is a

\[ \boxed{75\%\text{ relative reduction}}. \]

Reliability Allocation

In system design, a target reliability may be allocated across components.

For a simple independent series system with equal component reliabilities \(r\),

\[ r^n=R_{\text{target}}. \]

Therefore,

\[ \boxed{ r=R_{\text{target}}^{1/n} }. \]

Example: Required Component Reliability

A two-component series system must have reliability

\[ 0.96. \]

If both components have equal reliability \(r\),

\[ r^2=0.96. \]

Therefore,

\[ r=\sqrt{0.96} \] \[ \boxed{\approx0.9799}. \]

Testing Reliability

Reliability is often estimated from observed successes and failures.

If \(x\) successes occur in \(n\) comparable trials, a simple empirical estimate is

\[ \hat R=\frac{x}{n}. \]

The estimate itself is uncertain and should not be treated as exact.

Example: Empirical Reliability

Suppose \(985\) of \(1000\) units successfully complete a test.

Then

\[ \hat R=\frac{985}{1000} \] \[ \boxed{0.985}. \]

Reliability Data Can Be Censored

In lifetime studies, some items may still be functioning when observation ends.

Their exact failure times are unknown.

Such observations are called censored, and specialized survival-analysis methods account for them.

Reliability and Sensitivity Analysis

Reliability models can be sensitive to:

Sensitivity analysis helps identify which assumptions matter most.

Reliability and Value of Information

Additional inspection or testing may reduce uncertainty about system reliability.

The value of that information depends on whether it changes maintenance, replacement, redesign, or operating decisions.

Common Error: Adding Reliabilities in Series

For independent required components in series, reliability is multiplied, not added.

\[ R_{\text{series}}=R_1R_2. \]

Common Error: Multiplying Reliabilities in Parallel

In a simple parallel system, the system fails only if all components fail.

Therefore,

\[ R_{\text{parallel}} = 1-(1-R_1)(1-R_2), \]

not \(R_1R_2\).

Common Error: Assuming Independence Automatically

Multiplication rules require an independence assumption.

Shared dependencies can make the true system reliability materially lower than an independence model suggests.

Common Error: Confusing Reliability with Failure Rate

Reliability \(R(t)\) is a probability of surviving beyond time \(t\).

A failure or hazard rate describes failure intensity over time.

These quantities are related but are not interchangeable.

Common Error: Treating MTTF as a Guaranteed Lifetime

Mean time to failure is an average under a model.

It does not mean each unit will last exactly that long.

Common Error: Assuming Redundancy Eliminates Failure

Redundancy can greatly reduce failure probability, but common-cause events and shared dependencies may still cause complete failure.

Redundancy reduces risk; it does not automatically make risk zero.

A Reliable Procedure for Simple Reliability Problems

  1. Define what counts as system success.
  2. Identify component reliabilities or failure probabilities.
  3. Determine whether the structure is series, parallel, or mixed.
  4. Check whether independence is a reasonable assumption.
  5. Combine series components by multiplication.
  6. Combine parallel components through complementary failure probabilities.
  7. Simplify mixed systems one block at a time.
  8. Convert between reliability and failure probability as needed.
  9. Interpret the result in the system context.

A Reliable Procedure for Time-Based Reliability

  1. Define the lifetime variable \(T\).
  2. Choose or estimate an appropriate failure-time model.
  3. Compute \(R(t)=P(T>t)\).
  4. Compute \(F(t)=1-R(t)\) when failure probability is needed.
  5. Evaluate hazard or mean lifetime when relevant.
  6. Check whether model assumptions such as constant failure rate are reasonable.
  7. Use sensitivity analysis when key parameters are uncertain.

Practice 1: Complement

A component has reliability

\[ 0.94. \]

Find its failure probability.

Practice 2: Two Components in Series

Two independent components have reliabilities

\[ 0.90 \]

and

\[ 0.95. \]

Find the series-system reliability.

Practice 3: Two Components in Parallel

Two independent components each have reliability

\[ 0.80. \]

Find the parallel-system reliability.

Practice 4: Mixed System

Two independent components with reliability \(0.9\) are placed in parallel. That block is in series with a component of reliability \(0.8\).

Find the total system reliability.

Practice 5: Exponential Reliability

Suppose

\[ R(t)=e^{-0.05t}. \]

Find \(R(4)\).

Practice 6: MTTF

Under an exponential model,

\[ \lambda=0.04. \]

Find the mean time to failure.

Practice 7: Repeated Uses

A device succeeds independently on each use with probability \(0.98\).

Find the probability it succeeds on all \(5\) uses.

Practice 8: At Least One Failure

Using Practice 7, find the probability of at least one failure in the five uses.

Practice 9: Two-out-of-Three System

Three independent components each have reliability \(0.8\).

Find the reliability of a system that works when at least two components work.

Practice 10: Expected Failure Cost

A system has failure probability

\[ 0.015 \]

and each failure causes a loss of

\[ \$200{,}000. \]

Find the expected failure cost.

Practice Answers

Practice 1

\[ Q=1-0.94 \] \[ \boxed{0.06}. \]

Practice 2

\[ R=0.90(0.95) \] \[ \boxed{0.855}. \]

Practice 3

Each component fails with probability \(0.20\).

\[ R=1-(0.20)(0.20) \] \[ =1-0.04 \] \[ \boxed{0.96}. \]

Practice 4

Parallel block:

\[ R_p=1-(0.1)^2=0.99. \]

Series with the \(0.8\) component:

\[ R=0.99(0.8) \] \[ \boxed{0.792}. \]

Practice 5

\[ R(4)=e^{-0.05(4)} \] \[ =e^{-0.2} \] \[ \boxed{\approx0.8187}. \]

Practice 6

\[ E[T]=\frac{1}{0.04} \] \[ \boxed{25}. \]

Practice 7

\[ (0.98)^5 \] \[ \boxed{\approx0.9039}. \]

Practice 8

\[ 1-(0.98)^5 \] \[ \boxed{\approx0.0961}. \]

Practice 9

\[ R = \binom32(0.8)^2(0.2) + \binom33(0.8)^3. \] \[ =3(0.64)(0.2)+0.512. \] \[ =0.384+0.512. \] \[ \boxed{0.896}. \]

Practice 10

\[ E[L]=0.015(200{,}000) \] \[ \boxed{\$3{,}000}. \]

What to Remember

Reliability converts system success and failure into probability models that can be analyzed and improved.

The most important modeling principle is: system reliability depends not only on component reliability, but also on how the components are connected and how their failures depend on one another.

Where We Go Next

Reliability analysis studies uncertain success and failure within systems. The next lesson moves from system components to multiple decision makers, where each participant's outcome can depend on what others choose.

The next lesson, Games and Strategic Decisions, develops payoff matrices, dominant strategies, best responses, equilibrium, and the mathematics of interdependent choices.